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Employer Monopsony Power in the Labor Market for Undocumented Workers 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
 The model of monopsonistic discrimination was developed by Robinson (1933) to 
describe a labor market in which two groups of equally productive workers (men and women) 
are paid different wages because they differ in their elasticities of labor supply.  Robinson 
theorized that women were paid less than men because they were limited in their alternative 
labor market options as a result of their husbands' employment situations.  The source of the 
firm's monopsonistic power in the labor market derives from the behavior of workers, not from 
the degree of competition in the firm's product market.  In other words, the presence of a large 
number of competitive firms does not preclude monopsonistic discrimination.  In fact, a greater 
degree of product market competition will put additional pressures on an employer to take 
advantage of differential labor supply elasticities across workers.1  The purpose of this paper is to 
use a unique employer-employee matched data set to determine whether there is any empirical 
evidence of employers practicing monopsonistic discrimination against undocumented workers.  
If such evidence is found, it suggests that tighter restrictions on illegal immigration will raise 
production costs of firms and likely prices paid by consumers.  The analysis also has 
implications for potential employer opposition to tighter immigration policies. 
 The presence of monopsonistic employer power has been identified in a number of 
settings.  Evidence of potential monopsonistic discrimination against women as a result of lower 
labor supply elasticities (relative to men) is provided by Hirsch et al. (2006) and Barth and Dale-
Olsen (1999).2  Scully (1989) and Zimbalist (1992) provide evidence of monopsonistic 
                                                 
1 See Bhaskar et al. (2002), page 167. 
2 See Ofek and Merrill (1997) for empirical evidence of women facing fewer employment opportunities as a result 
of being geographically constrained by their husband's employment choices. 
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discrimination (at least through the 1980s) in baseball for players that are contractually limited in 
their employment options by being tied to one team before achieving free-agent status.  Scott et 
al. (1985) offer similar evidence for basketball players.  In the case where workers are divided 
and one group is paid less than an equally productive different group, Lang et al. (2005) present 
a theoretical model in which monopsonistic labor market outcomes can arise in equilibrium and 
does not necessarily require firms to overtly discriminate against the lower-paid group. It only 
requires that the disadvantaged group think employers are discriminatory.  They offer this model 
as explanation for the persistent wage gap between black and white workers.3   The labor market 
for undocumented workers meets the classic conditions in which employers can be successful in 
practicing monopsonistic discrimination--identifiable characteristics on which groups of workers 
can be segmented, and one of the groups of workers being limited in their employment 
opportunities. 
 First of all, documented and undocumented workers in the U.S. are believed to be 
distinguishable from one another without much effort.  The Department of Homeland Security 
estimates for January 2008 that 61 percent of unauthorized immigrants come from Mexico 
(Hoefer et al. 2009).  Clearly not all Hispanic individuals are undocumented, but, in the absence 
of time consuming document verification, ethnicity and language proficiency may be used by 
employers as a proxy for their best guess of whether a worker is undocumented.  Second, for fear 
of being deported, undocumented workers are likely unwilling to complain about low wages or 
poor employment environments.  It is also not unreasonable to expect that the more employers to 
which undocumented workers expose themselves, the higher the risk of deportation.  And 
indeed, it is likely that there are many firms who will simply refuse to hire undocumented 
                                                 
3 Raphael and Riker (1999) offer empirical evidence for the role geographic mobility plays in limiting the 
employment opportunities of blacks, thus contributing to observed racial wage differentials. 
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workers or that undocumented workers are geographically constrained by the support (or lack) of 
social networks.  All of these factors reduce employment opportunities of undocumented 
workers, ceteris paribus.  Stark (2007) presents a compelling theoretical mechanism through 
which the work effort of undocumented workers is increased as their probability of deportation 
increases, which, in turn expands the wedge between undocumented worker productivity and 
their wage.  Semple (2008) offers anecdotal evidence that undocumented workers are at the 
mercy of their employers.  An undocumented worker reported to Semple that an employer 
refused to pay him about $1,000 he was owed for work performed, but that, "fear [of being 
deported] kept my mouth shut." 
 Very little empirical investigation of the labor market experiences of undocumented 
workers exists.  DeFreitas (1988) and Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2009) investigate the wage 
impact of the presence of undocumented workers, finding modest impacts that vary across 
worker skill level and across sectors.  Brown et al. (2008) presents evidence that employing 
undocumented workers gives firms a fairly significant competitive advantage, suggesting that the 
lower wages paid to undocumented workers likely derives from a monopsonistic position of the 
employer, rather than making up for lower productivity of the workers.  This paper estimates 
labor supply elasticities for documented and undocumented workers, finding evidence that 
undocumented workers are less sensitive to wages than their documented co-workers.  There is 
also modest evidence of displacement of documented workers as more undocumented workers 
arrive, although the analysis is not able to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
displacement effects. 
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II. The Data 
 The primary data used for the analyses in this paper are the Employer File and the 
Individual Wage File, compiled by the Georgia Department of Labor for the purposes of 
administering the state's Unemployment Insurance (UI) program.  These data are highly 
confidential and strictly limited in their distribution.  The data are available from the first quarter 
of 1990 through the fourth quarter of 2006.  The Employer File provides an almost complete 
census of firms in the U.S., covering approximately 99.7 percent of all wage and salary workers 
(Committee on Ways and Means 2004).4  The establishment-level information includes the 
number of employees, the total wage bill, and the NAICS classification of each establishment.  
The Individual Wage File, which links individual workers to their employer, is used to construct 
workforce characteristics at the firm level, such as workforce churning and the share of new hires 
that is undocumented.  We take advantage of the longitudinal nature of the data to calculate the 
firm’s age, turnover rates, and worker tenure.  The data also contain a 6-digit NAICS industry 
code and the county of location, allowing us to construct or merge in industry- and county-level 
indicators, such as county unemployment rate. 
 Regrettably, the data set contains no information about workers' demographics or, more 
importantly, immigration status.  However, again making use of the longitudinal nature of the 
data, we estimate an individual fixed-effects model, allowing us to control for individual 
characteristics that do not vary over time (e.g., innate human capital, immigration status). 
 A. Identifying Invalid Social Security Numbers 
 Every quarter employers must file a report with their state's Department of Labor 
detailing all wages paid to workers who are covered under the Social Security Act of 1935.  Each 
                                                 
4 Certain jobs in agriculture, domestic services, non-profit organizations are excluded from UI coverage and, 
therefore these workers are not included in the data (Committee on Ways and Means 2004).   For information about 
which workers are covered, see U.S. Department of Labor (2008). 
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worker on this report is identified by his/her social security number (SSN).  There are a number 
of ways in which one can establish that a reported social security number is invalid.  The Social 
Security Administration provides a service by which an employer can upload a file of SSNs for 
checking, but one must register as an employer to obtain this service.5  In addition, there are 
several known limitations on what can be considered a valid social security number, so a simple 
algorithm is used to check whether each number conforms to the valid parameters.  
 There are three pieces to a SSN.6  The first three numbers are referred to as the Area 
Number.  This number is assigned based on the state in which the application for a SSN was 
made; it does not necessarily reflect the state of residence.  The lowest Area Number possible is 
001 and the highest Area Number ever issued, as of December 2006, is 772.  Using information 
provided by the SSA, the dates at which area numbers between 691 and 772 are first assigned 
can be determined.  Any SSN with an Area Number equal to 000, greater than 772, or which 
shows up before the officially assigned date, will be considered invalid. 
 The second piece of a SSN consists of the two-digit Group Number.  The lowest group 
number is 01, and they are assigned in non-consecutive order.  Any SSN with a Group Number 
equal to 00 or with a Group Number that appears in the data out of sequence with the Area 
Number will be considered invalid. 
 The last four digits of a SSN are referred to as the Serial Number.  These are assigned 
consecutively from 0001 to 9999.  Any SSN with a Serial Number equal to 0000 is invalid. 
 In 1996 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) introduced the Individual Tax Identification 
Number (ITIN) to allow individuals who had income from the U.S. to file a tax return (the first 
                                                 
5 See Social Security Number Verification Service <http://www.ssa.gov/employer/ssnv.htm>. 
6 Historical information and information about valid SSNs can be found at the Social Security Administration's web 
sites: <http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/geocard.html>,  <http://www.xocialsecurity.gov/employer/stateweb.htm>, 
and <http://www.socialsecurity.gov/employer/ssnvhighgroup.htm >. 
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ITIN was issued in 1997).  It is simply a "tax processing number," and does not authorize an 
individual to work in the U.S.  Employers are instructed by the IRS to "not accept an ITIN in 
place of a SSN for employee identification for work.  An ITIN is only available to resident and 
nonresident aliens who are not eligible for U.S. employment and need identification for other tax 
purposes."7  ITIN numbers have a "9" in the first digit of the Area Number and a "7" or "8" in the 
first digit of the Group Number.  Anyone with this numbering scheme will be identified as 
having an invalid Area Number, as they are not authorized to work.  The percent of SSN with 
high area numbers that also match the ITIN numbering scheme has risen from about one percent 
in 1997 to over 60 percent by the end of 2006.  Identifying undocumented workers with ITIN 
numbers will be important in the fixed-effects estimation described below. 
 A series of SSNs were de-commissioned by the Social Security Administration because 
they had been put on fake Social Security Cards used as props to sell wallets.8  Apparently, some 
people who purchased the wallets thought the fake Social Security Cards were real and started 
using them as their own.  If any of these 21 "pocketbook" SSNs appear in the data, they are 
considered invalid, although their frequency is so low as to be inconsequential.  In addition, a 
number of SSNs are exactly equal to the employer identification number.  These are invalid, 
primarily because they have too few digits.  In any instance where a SSN is used for more than 
one person on a firm's UI wage report or does not have the required number of digits (including 
zeros), the SSN is considered invalid. 
 The possibility that someone fraudulently uses a valid SSN assigned to someone else 
poses a special problem.  First of all, the SSN will show up multiple times across firms in one 
quarter for workers with different surnames (the wage report includes the first three characters of 
                                                 
7 "Hiring Employees," <http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98164,00.html>.  Also see, "Individual 
Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN)," <http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96287,00.html>. 
8 See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (1990). 
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the workers' surnames).  With this information alone, it is not possible to know which worker is 
using the SSN fraudulently and who the valid owner of the number is.  If one of the 
SSN/surname pairs shows up in the data initially in a quarter by itself, this is the pair that is 
considered valid and all other duplicates (with different surnames) are considered invalid.  
 B. Does "Invalid" mean "Undocumented?" 
 Not all invalid SSN are classified as undocumented workers; examining the patterns of 
incidence of different types of invalid SSNs suggests that some types are firm generated rather 
than worker generated.  Figure 1 illustrates the incidence patterns across types of invalid SSNs in 
construction.  This pattern is consistently found in the other sectors as well.  The percent of 
workers with SSNs having a high area number or out-of-sequence group number displays the 
expected growth in undocumented workers (see Hoefer et al. 2007), whereas the incidence of 
SSNs for other reasons exhibits a flat to declining, highly seasonal pattern.  The strong seasonal 
nature of the other invalid reasons suggests that firms are temporarily assigning invalid SSN 
numbers to workers before having time to gather the information for the purpose of record 
keeping/reporting.  Or, firms may decide to not bother obtaining a SSN for workers who will 
only be employed a very short time.9  The high degree of churning observed among workers with 
invalid SSNs for these other reasons is consistent with either of these practices.10   
[Figure 1 here] 
Since there is no way to know whether a temporary assignment by the firm of an invalid 
SSN is to merely cover for temporary employment of an undocumented worker or to allow the 
firm to file its wage report before having had a chance to record the worker's valid SSN, the 
                                                 
9 Indeed, a worker has 90 days to resolve a discrepancy that results in the receipt of a "no-match" letter from the 
Social Security Administration.  The employee may be long gone before such a letter is even received. 
10 The average churning rates for SSNs with invalid area numbers, invalid group numbers, duplicate SSNs with 
different surnames, and invalid for other reasons are 26.9%, 55.7%, 188.3%, and 215.6%, respectively.   
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analysis below takes the conservative tack by considering as undocumented only those workers 
whose SSNs are classified as invalid because the area number is too high or the group number is 
assigned out of sequence.  This will clearly undercount the actual number of undocumented 
workers, so that any effect identified in the analysis will also likely under-estimate the true effect 
of the presence of undocumented workers on firm exit.  We take pains, however, to not include 
workers with invalid SSNs for these other reasons in the construction of worker characteristics 
among workers with valid SSNs.  However, they are included in counts of aggregate firm 
employment.   
 Figure 2 plots the prevalence of undocumented workers in the six broadly defined sectors 
with the highest incidences.11  The concentration of workers in these sectors was also identified 
nationally by Fortuny et al. (2007).12  The pattern of growth is also consistent with Fortuny et al. 
who estimate that 72 percent of unauthorized immigrants in Georgia arrived in the last 10 years.  
[Figure 2 here] 
 Fortuny et al. (2007) estimate that 4.5 percent of the workforce in Georgia was 
undocumented in 2004.  In our sample 1.2 percent of workers are classified as undocumented in 
2004.  The implication is that the sample used for the analysis in this paper is capturing at least 
26 percent of all undocumented workers in the state of Georgia.  This is a respectable 
representation, given that to be included in the sample an undocumented worker must be 
reported by the employer to the Department of Labor in the first place, and that we are being 
very conservative in the identification of workers as undocumented. 
                                                 
11 Agriculture is excluded from the graph for display purposes; the pattern of employment is considerably more 
seasonal and the percent of workers that is undocumented in agriculture reached just under six percent by 2006. 
12 Fortuny et al. (2007) estimate that nationally in 2004 the percent of workers in leisure and hospitality and 
construction that was undocumented was 10 percent each, nine percent of workers in agriculture, and six percent 
each in manufacturing, professional and business services, and other services. 
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 C. Are Undocumented Workers Correctly Identified? 
 It is crucial to establish confidence in the mechanism employed to identify undocumented 
workers.  The Department of Homeland Security estimates for January 2008 that 61 percent of 
unauthorized immigrants come from Mexico (Hoefer et al. 2009).  Clearly not all Hispanic 
individuals are unauthorized immigrants, but a first test of the accuracy of identifying 
undocumented workers might be to compare the geographic distribution of those identified as 
undocumented for the purposes of analysis in this paper and the geographic distribution of 
various ethnic and racial groups across counties in the state.  Table 1 presents these correlation 
coefficients for 2005. 
[Table 1 here] 
 The correlation between the percent of the county population that is Hispanic and the 
percent of workers in the county identified as undocumented is 0.18 (of course, some individuals 
may live and work in different counties).  The correlations with the percent that is Asian and the 
percent that is African American in the counties are both negative.  The correlation of the percent 
of firms in the county employing undocumented workers with ethnicity is also positive and 
highest as it relates the percent of the county population that is Hispanic (0.38).  The correlation 
of the presence of these firms with percent of the county population that is Asian is also positive, 
but smaller at 0.27; the correlation with the percent of the population that is African American is 
again negative.   
 Additionally, the rate of growth seen in both the number and percent of undocumented 
workers identified in Georgia matches closely the rate of growth in the Social Security 
Administration's (SSA) earnings suspense file (ESF).  The ESF is a repository of social security 
taxes paid by employers that cannot be matched to a valid name or SSN.  It is widely believed 
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that this growth in the ESF reflects growing incidence of unauthorized work in the U.S. 
(Bovbjerg 2006). 
 Figure 3 plots the number of workers identified (panel a) and the percent of workers 
identified (panel b) as undocumented along with the size of the ESF.  This figure shows a 
remarkable consistency between the growth seen in workers identified as undocumented and the 
ESF.  Payments on wages in the ESF reflect only about four percent of all initial non-matching 
earnings reports (the others were resolved through an error identification process).  In addition, 
about 43 percent of employers associated with wage payments that end up in the ESF come from 
only five of 83 broad industry classifications, with eating and drinking establishments (leisure 
and hospitality, 17 percent) and construction (10 percent) being the largest contributors 
(Bovbjerg 2006). 
[Figure 3 here] 
 The positive correlation between the Hispanic population across counties in Georgia and 
the percent of workers identified as undocumented for this analysis, as well as closely matching 
growth in undocumented workers identified in Georgia and growth in the SSA ESF 
independently suggest that the mechanism employed in this paper to identify undocumented 
workers is accurate. 
 D. Sample Means 
 For reasons discussed below, the analysis is constrained to include workers only between 
1995 and 2000 inclusive.  Table 2 presents some means for this sample of workers.  In addition, 
the table contains means for an even smaller sub-set of undocumented workers whose SSN 
numbers follow the number scheme of ITIN numbers; this sample is only valid starting in 1997, 
when the first ITIN number was issued.   
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[Table 2 here] 
 Documented workers earn 50 percent more, on average, than undocumented workers.  
Some of this wage differential could be because of the concentration of undocumented workers 
in lower-paying industries or occupations, undocumented workers working fewer hours, or the 
upward push in the occupational chain of documented workers with the arrival of lower-skilled 
undocumented workers (Pedace 2006).13  The undocumented wage gap increases as workers 
move up the wage distribution.  
 Undocumented workers are likely to have been on their current job a shorter amount of 
time and reflect greater separation behavior (not holding anything else constant).  Undocumented 
workers appear to be concentrated among smaller employers who experience a greater degree of 
churning among its documented workforce, suggesting a need for workforce flexibility, as has 
been documented among firms that employ undocumented workers (Morales 1983-1984).  The 
smaller firm size could be reflecting the typical size of firms in industries more likely to hire 
undocumented workers.  The higher share of new hires that is undocumented among the 
undocumented sample suggests that undocumented workers are concentrated in certain 
industries. 
 There are some notable differences in the distribution of workers across industry skill 
intensity and NAICS classification.14  Most notably, undocumented workers are more 
concentrated in agriculture, construction, and leisure and hospitality.  Interestingly, 
undocumented workers using ITIN numbers are more similarly distributed across industry skill 
intensity relative to documented workers than all undocumented workers are. 
 
                                                 
13 The magnitude of the wage penalties is consistent with the finding by Rivera-Batiz (1999) that legal immigrants 
earn about 42 percent more than illegal immigrants. 
14 Appendix B describes the construction of skill classifications. 
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III. Theoretical and Empirical Framework 
 A. Elasticities of Separation 
 Appealing to a simple version of the standard search problem and assuming that workers 
are more willing to work for firms paying higher wages, the following separation rates for 
documented and undocumented workers can be derived:15 
 
( ; [ ]) (1 [ ])
( ; [ ]) (1 [ ])
d d d d
u u u u
S w F w F w
S w F w F w
δ λ
δ λ
= + −
= + −  , (1) 
where kS  is the separation rate of documented (k=d) and undocumented (k=u) workers; δ  is the 
job destruction rate, assumed to be the same for documented and undocumented workers; and kλ  
is the job offer arrival rate for documented and undocumented workers.  The mere presence of 
some firms that will not hire undocumented workers means the offer arrival rate is lower for 
undocumented workers than for documented workers,λ λ≤u d .   
 Based on the assumptions leading to equation (1) and the additional labor market 
constraints that undocumented workers face, undocumented workers are expected to draw wage 
offers from a distribution ( [ ]uF w ) that is stochastically dominated by the wage offer 
distribution that documented workers face ( [ ]dF w ), implying that at any given wage,w? , 
≤? ?[ ] [ ]d uF w F w , or ≤ ≤ ≤? ?Pr[ ] Pr[ ]d uW w W w .  The lower offer arrival rate and stochastically 
inferior wage distribution lead to the result that for any given wage,w? , the separation rate 
among undocumented workers is lower than among documented workers:16 
                                                 
15 See Burdett and Mortensen (1988), Manning (2003, sections 2.2 and 4.4), and Ransom and Oaxaca (2007).  The 
basic assumptions of the model are that firms have identical constant returns to scale, workers are identical, each 
worker has the same value of leisure, some workers are employed and others are unemployed, and workers can 
search while employed.  The main implication from the equilibrium search model (that is relevant for this paper) is 
that the firm has to offer a higher wage to attract more workers.  Also see Jovanovic (1979) whose job matching 
model also predicts that workers paid a higher wage are less likely to separate from their employers. 
16 This result only requires one of the two conditions--lower offer arrival rate or stochastically inferior wage offer 
distribution--but it is not unreasonable to expect both of these conditions to be satisfied. 
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This result is consistent with DeFreitas (1988) who finds that Hispanic immigrants (although not 
necessarily undocumented) do not exhibit higher turnover tendencies than documented workers 
when comparing equally skilled workers in the same sectors.  The ability of firms to exploit their 
monospony power is predicated not on how often workers separate, but on how sensitive that 
separation behavior is to changes in the wage.  Constructing the elasticity of separation allows a 
comparison of workers' sensitivity to wage changes abstracting from expected wage level of the 
workers. 
 From equation (2), the elasticity of separation with respect to the wage for worker of type 
k, evaluated at the expected wage for that worker type ( kw ) is: 
 [ ; ( )] [ ] 0
( ) ( )
λε =
==
⎧ ⎫∂ −= = <⎨ ⎬∂⎩ ⎭k kk
k k k k
k
Sw k kw w
w ww w
S w F w w f w w
w S w S w
. (3) 
In general, for which group of workers the elasticity is larger cannot be determined analytically; 
the shape of the wage offer density function relative to the expected wage for each group will 
ultimately determine the relative sizes of the elasticity.  The point is, knowing that the wage offer 
distribution of documented workers stochastically dominates the wage offer distribution of 
undocumented workers indicates that the separation rate of documented workers exceeds that of 
undocumented workers (within the framework of this simple search model and at a given wage).  
However, it does not tell us how sensitive the workers will be to wage changes, relative to one 
another. 
 B. Elasticities of Labor Supply 
 A technique suggested by Ransom and Oaxaca (2008) is used to estimate the labor supply 
elasticity of documented and undocumented workers based on estimates of workers' separation 
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elasticities (also see Barth and Dale-Olsen 2009).17  This technique relies on two assumptions.  
First, it requires that the flow of recruits (or new hires) equals the flow of separations; that one 
employer's separation is another employer's recruitment.  This assumption would not necessarily 
be valid in circumstances of very weak labor markets.  The years 1995-2000 are the years in the 
data that could be considered to satisfy this requirement.  Each year during this time period, the 
percent of workers that is separating and the percent of workers being hired differ by, at most, 
three percentage points, except for the subset of undocumented workers with ITIN numbers, 
where the difference can be slightly greater.18  However, among all groups of workers over this 
time period, the percent being hired always exceeds the percent separating. 
 A second assumption is required as a result of how undocumented workers are identified.  
Since undocumented workers are defined as those using certain types of invalid SSNs, it is not 
reasonable to expect that an undocumented worker would use the same SSN when moving from 
one employer to another.  Consequently, the worker's SSN cannot be used as a worker fixed 
effect within the undocumented sample.  A worker fixed effect is constructed by combining the 
worker's SSN and the employer id number (SSN/EMPID) so that multiple observations within an 
employer are treated as observations from the same person, but the same SSN across employers 
will be treated as different workers.19  This is less than ideal, but necessary to boost the number 
of undocumented observations.  The presence of ITIN numbers, however, does provide a type of 
robustness check on the results.  The analysis will be repeated for the years 1997 (the first year 
                                                 
17 As they point out, it is much easier to estimate the elasticity of separation than it is to estimation the elasticity of 
labor supply (or elasticity of recruitment).  Bhaskar et al. (2002) also make use of estimated separation elasticities to 
make inferences about employer monopsony power, emphasizing that the focus on separation elasticities is not a 
focus on the level of turnover, but on the sensitivity of those separations to the wage.  Also see Barth and Dale-
Olsen (2009) who exploit the same relationship in a firm-level analysis of labor supply elasticity differences 
between men and women. 
18 The average annual separation and new hire rates are only statistically significantly different from each other 
among documented workers at the 90 percent confidence level. 
19 Barth and Dale-Olsen (2009) construct a similar "worker/work-place" fixed effect for their analysis. 
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ITIN numbers were issued) through 2000, with the undocumented worker sample restricted to 
workers whose reported SSN matches the ITIN number scheme.  Then the SSN by itself will be 
used as the worker fixed effect, assuming that undocumented workers with ITIN numbers will 
use the same number across employers.  The problem that arises with this specification is a lack 
of degrees of freedom; workers with ITIN numbers represent only about two percent of the entire 
undocumented worker sample and requiring at least two observations per worker cuts the sample 
even more.  The results generally lead to the same conclusions regarding labor supply elasticities 
as those reported using the SSN/EMPID fixed effect. 
 Given these considerations, the labor supply elasticity can be estimated as the negative of 
two times the separation elasticity (see Ransom and Oaxaca 2008, p. 4): 
 2 0k knw swε ε= − > , (4) 
with equation (4) implying that u dnw nwε ε≤ . 
 Workers' separation elasticities, then, are estimated by first estimating the following 
linear probability separation equation separately for documented workers (k=d) and for 
undocumented workers (k=u):20 
௜ܵ௡௝௧ ൌ ߛ଴௞ ൅ ߛଵ௞ ln൫ݓ௜௡௝௧൯ ൅ ߛଶ௞݄௡௧ ൅ ߛଷ௞ ௜ܺ௡௝௧ ൅ ߛସ௞ܻܳ௧ ൅ ߜ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௡௝௧ (5) 
where ௜ܵ௡௝௧ is the probability that worker i separates from employer n (in industry j) in quarter t; 
ݓ௜௡௝௧ is the real quarterly wage observed for worker i in quarter t; ݄௡௧ is the percent of new hires 
in firm n that are undocumented; and ௜ܺ௡௝௧ are other characteristics of the worker, firm, industry 
at time t that might affect the rate of separation.   ܻܳ௧is a continuous regressor defined as Y.Q, 
                                                 
20 There is a class of workers that have invalid SSNs but does not meet our criteria for "undocumented."  These 
workers are described in Section II.B. and are excluded from both the documented and undocumented worker 
samples.  A linear probability model is estimated as opposed to a probit model because of the large number of fixed 
effects included. 
 - 16 - 
where year Y ∈  [97,100] and quarter Q ∈  [00,75]. 21 ߜ௜ is the individual fixed effect defined as 
the worker's reported SSN.  The percent of new hires in firm n at time t that are undocumented is 
calculated as 100*[ /( )]u u dnt nt nt nth H H H= + , where kH  is the number of undocumented (k=u) and 
documented (k=d) workers hired by the firm during the previous four quarters. 
 In order to control for the possibility that undocumented workers are drawn to industries 
experiencing a rising relative demand for their skills or to industries that have a history of hiring 
undocumented workers (see Card and DiNardo 2000), the share of workers in the 6-digit NAICS 
industry that are undocumented is also included as a regressor.  The standard errors will be 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level, since multiple workers may be employed by the same 
firm.  A worker is considered separated if the worker's SSN disappears from the employer's files 
for at least four consecutive quarters.   
 In addition to the regressors of particular interest, worker tenure is included and is 
expected to be negatively related to worker separation (Jovanovic 1979).  The age and size of the 
worker's firm and the churning of workers by the firm are expected to affect observed individual 
separations (Burgess et al. 2001);22 both older and larger firms are expected to have hiring 
mechanisms in place to generate more successful hires, thus less separation.  County level 
unemployment rate is also included to control for general local labor market conditions.23 
 Given the estimation results from equation (5), the average separation elasticity with 
respect to wages for workers of type k can be calculated as follows: 
                                                 
21 A continuous regressor is chosen for parsimony; using dichotomous year and quarter indicators does not alter 
conclusions presented here. 
22 Churning is measured as the difference between worker flows and job flows divided by the average employment 
during the period.  Worker flows is the sum of hires and separations and job flows is net employment change.  
ܥܪܷܴ ௝ܰ௧ ൌ
ሾு௜௥௘௦ାௌ௘௣௔௥௔௧௜௢௡௦ሿିൣหேೕ೟ିேೕ೟షభห൧
ൣ൫ேೕ೟ାேೕ೟షభ൯/ଶ൧
,  ௧ܰ is the number of workers in time t (Burgess et al. 2001). 
23 Due to limited degrees of freedom among the undocumented worker sample, we've included what we consider the 
bare minimum regressors.  Additional regressors were investigated, such as county level firm birth and death rates 
and a measure of market competitiveness; their inclusion did not change the results on the regressors of interest or 
the conclusions presented here. 
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 1
1 1
1 1 1ˆ
k kN N
k ki
sw k k
i ii i
s w
N w s N s
ε γ
= =
∂= =∂∑ ∑ , (6) 
where kN is the total number of workers of type k (Ransom and Oaxaca 2008, p. 12).  The 
average labor supply elasticity for workers of type k, then, from equation (4), is 2k knw swε ε= − . 
 To the extent that the arrival of undocumented workers depresses wages in a labor market 
or results in employers substituting documented workers with undocumented workers, an 
outflow of documented workers is expected.  This potential outflow could not only affect 
estimates of the wage impact, but could also have considerable social welfare impacts if 
documented workers were flowing into unemployment (rather than to merely another job).  The 
impact of undocumented worker inflow on separation behavior can also be investigated using the 
estimates obtained from equation (5).  The average separation elasticity with respect to the share 
of new hires that is undocumented is calculated as: 
 2
1 1
1 1 ˆ
k kN N
k ki i
sh k k
i ii i
s h h
N h s N s
ε γ
= =
∂= =∂∑ ∑ . (7) 
The average separation elasticity with respect to the hiring of undocumented workers gives us 
some indication of the degree of displacement taking place.  Documented workers may 
voluntarily separate from their employers as wages are driven lower or in anticipation of losing 
their jobs down the road.  Involuntary displacement would be the direct replacement of 
documented workers with undocumented workers.  The analysis, however, will not be able to 
distinguish between the types of displacement. 
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IV. Results 
 A. Full Sample 
 Table 3 contains the OLS fixed-effects linear probability estimates for equation (5), 
estimated for the full sample of individuals from 1995 through 2000, using the combined 
SSN/EMPID as the worker fixed effect.  Estimates are presented for documented and 
undocumented workers separately.     
[Table 3 here] 
 As expected, higher paid workers and workers with longer tenure have lower 
probabilities of separation.  Workers employed at older, smaller, and firms with more workforce 
churning are more likely to separate.    The share of workers in the industry that is undocumented 
does not appear to affect individual separation rates, but the greater the share of new hires that is 
undocumented at the firm increases workers' separation.  Although only significant among 
documented workers, the greater the county level unemployment rate, the less likely a worker is 
to separate, which is consistent with worker effort models (for example, see Machin and 
Manning 1992).   
 The parameter estimate on log wage is transformed into an average labor supply elasticity 
and reported at the bottom of the table.  As hypothesized, undocumented workers are less 
sensitive (about 13 percent less sensitive) to wage changes than documented workers (the 
differences are more dramatic among different groups of workers as will be discussed below).  A 
one percent decrease in the wage reduces the supply of undocumented workers by 0.49 percent, 
but reduces the supply of documented workers by 0.57 percent.24  In other words, documented 
                                                 
24 While the focus here is not on the actual point estimate, but rather their relative size across worker status, these 
labor supply elasticities are within the range of those estimated by others.  For example, Costa (2000) estimated 
cross-sectional labor supply elasticities for men and women of 0.04 and 0.13, respectively; Benjamin et al. (2007) 
estimated an elasticity of 0.24 for real estate brokers.  Bhaskar et al. (2002) report elasticities that would be in the 
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workers are more likely than undocumented workers to quit their jobs in response to a wage 
reduction. 
 In addition, newly arriving undocumented workers appear to have a greater impact on 
displacing earlier arriving undocumented workers than on displacing documented workers.  A 
one percent increase in the share of new hires that are undocumented increases the separation of 
documented workers by only 0.001 percent and undocumented workers by 0.03 percent.   This 
result is consistent with that of Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Lalonde and Topel (1991) who 
find that the arrival of immigrants negatively impacts the labor market outcomes of earlier 
arrivals more than those of natives. 
 B. Estimates Across Income Groups and Sectors 
 Estimated elasticities for the full sample might be masking more dramatic differences 
within subsets of workers.  Labor supply elasticities estimated separately across wage groups and 
broad industry characteristics are reported in the first two columns of Table 4 and they tell a 
remarkably consistent story.  With only a very few exceptions, undocumented workers are 
significantly less sensitive to wage changes than documented workers.  Undocumented workers 
are also consistently more likely to be displaced by newly arriving undocumented workers than 
are documented workers; the displacement elasticity estimates across worker groups are found in 
the first two columns of Table 5.   
[Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 Across both types of workers, the elasticity of labor supply increases in the wage level, 
with higher paid workers more sensitive to wage changes than lower paid workers, then 
decreases (becomes negative among documented workers) at the highest wage level.  This 
                                                                                                                                                             
range of 0.7 and 1.2.   Ransom and Oaxaca (2007), in their single-firm study, estimated elasticities close to 2.0 for 
both men and women. 
 - 20 - 
pattern of elasticities across wage groups is indicative of a labor supply curve that starts out 
concave then has a transition point between the third and fourth quartile.  Although not 
significant, a negative labor supply elasticity among documented workers is consistent with a 
backward bending labor supply curve found by others among higher income workers (e.g., Hall 
1973).25  Comparing elasticities across quartiles, it appears that the overall weaker sensitivity to 
wage changes among undocumented workers is being driven by the behavior of workers in the 
bottom half of the wage distribution, which is where most undocumented workers find 
themselves.  
 Across broad sector classifications and grouping workers by their industry's skill level, 
undocumented workers are less sensitive to wage changes than documented workers, with the 
only exception being construction and leisure and hospitality.  These are notable given the 
relatively large representation of undocumented workers in those sectors.  However, Yueh 
(2008) presents evidence suggesting that workers with larger social networks will exhibit greater 
labor supply elasticities (ceteris paribus) than those with smaller social networks, and we would 
expect this "social network" effect to be strongest in sectors with a larger concentration of 
undocumented workers, such as construction and leisure and hospitality.   
 Another notable difference is that documented workers become more sensitive as skill 
intensity increases, but undocumented workers become less sensitive.  This may be because the 
number of higher skill job opportunities are fewer and far between than low skill job 
opportunities for undocumented workers. 
                                                 
25 This pattern of increasing, then decreasing labor supply elasticities across income quartiles is also consistent with 
own wage elasticities estimated by Hotchkiss and Moore (2007) across education levels. 
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 C. Robustness Check 
 Using the combined SSN and employer id for the worker fixed effect we lose the link 
between workers across employers.  In order to see whether this sacrifice affects the basic 
conclusions, the separation equation was re-estimated including only those undocumented 
workers whose SSN matches the ITIN number scheme, on the assumption that if a worker is 
using an ITIN number, he/she will use it across multiple employers.  The years are restricted to 
1997 through 2000 since 1997 is the first year ITIN numbers were issued.  The sample of 
undocumented workers is reduced substantially from over 100,000 observations to about 1,300 
observations.  The results of these estimations across worker groups are reported in the last two 
columns of Tables 4 and 5.   
 For the full samples, there is a greater difference in the labor supply elasiticities across 
worker status, with a one percent decrease in the wage increasing separation among documented 
workers by 0.62 percent, but among undocumented workers by only 0.48 percent.  Except for the 
first quartile of wages, the first category of skill intensity, retail trade, and the leisure and 
hospitality sector, all other estimates of the labor supply elasticities (that are significantly 
different from zero) reinforce the conclusion that undocumented workers are less sensitive to 
wage changes than documented workers.  Generally, the year restriction and use of the SSN 
fixed effect (as opposed to the combined SSN/EMPID) does not affect the general magnitudes or 
significance levels of these estimated elasticities.  In addition, the basic pattern of elasticities 
across different worker and industry characteristics (wage quartiles, skill intensity, etc.) are the 
same. 
 The estimates of elasticities of separation with respect to new hires are pretty much all 
over the board and most insignificant for this restricted sample of undocumented workers.  
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Among documented workers, the different years of analysis and use of the SSN as a fixed effect 
(as opposed to the combined SSN/EMPID) does not generally affect the magnitude or 
significance levels of these estimated elasticities. 
 
V. Implications and Conclusions 
 The analysis in this paper presents evidence of employer monopsony power in the labor 
market for undocumented workers.  The limited employment and grievance opportunities of 
undocumented workers makes this an un-surprising result, however this finding has implications 
for firm profits and product prices.  Firms who enjoy a monopsony position in the labor market 
also enjoy greater profits from being able to pay at least some of its workers a wage lower than 
their marginal revenue product.  These firms may not take kindly to efforts to limit their supply 
of inexpensive labor through stricter immigration policies.  In addition, if those policies were 
successful in limiting the supply of undocumented workers, resulting in higher production costs; 
consumers may see the effect in the form of higher product prices (see Cortes 2008).   
 Alternatively, if policies were focused on eliminating the monopsony position of 
employers, and employers paid all workers a wage equal to their marginal revenue product, they 
would be indifferent between hiring documented and undocumented workers.  While this may 
not seem like a boon to documented workers, they would now be competing with undocumented 
workers on skill and human capital rather than on a willingness to be paid less than their actual 
contribution to the firm's output.  Eliminating the firm's monopsony power would require 
somehow legitimizing the presence of workers who are now considered undocumented.  One 
way to do this would be to create a permeable border, allowing the flow of workers to be dictated 
by the demand of employers through something like a guest-worker program.  Facilitating an 
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employers' ability to draw workers from a larger pool when needed would likely have to be 
accompanied by strictly enforced penalties for hiring workers outside of the guest-worker 
program.  Of course, policy makers may have other goals in mind, such as ensuring the highest 
wage possible for U.S. citizens. If this is the case, the implications for immigration policy would 
look very different. 
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Figure 3. Growth in the earnings suspense file and the total number and percent of workers 
identified as undocumented in Georgia, 1990-2006. 
   
Source: Huse (2002) for estimates 1990-2000, Johnson (2007) for estimates 2001-2004, and authors' 
calculations.  Dollar estimates reflect 2006 values, using the PCE chain-weighted deflator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Correlation between percent of workers identified as undocumented by county and the 
percent of firms that employ them, with the percent of the population in each county that is 
Hispanic, African American, and Asian. 
 
 
Percent of Population that is: 
 
Percent of Undocumented 
Workers in County 
Percent of Firms Employing 
Undocumented Workers 
in County 
Hispanic 0.18 0.38 
Asian -0.02 0.27 
African American -0.19 -0.13 
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(a) Growth in earnings suspense file and number of 
undocumented workers identified in Georgia, 1990-2006.
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(b) Growth in earnings suspense file and percent of workers 
identified as undocumented in Georgia, 1990-2006.
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Percent of Workers 
Identified as
Undocumented (R)
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Table 2. Sample means.  
 Documented 
1995-2000 
Undocumented 
1995-2000 
Undocumented 
1997-2000 
ITIN only 
Wage $4,961 
(12081) 
 
$3,272 
(7247) 
$3,500 
(5421) 
     First wage quartile range [1-566] [1-477] [3-598] 
     Second wage quartile range [567-1,969] [478-1,675] [600-2,011] 
    Third wage quartile range [1,970-5,299] [1,676-4,199] [2,018-4,839] 
     Fourth wage quartile range [5,300-1,280,235] 
 
[4,200-239,197] [4,840-84,676] 
Worker tenure (number of quarters) 3.20 
(5.42) 
 
1.66 
(1.83) 
1.65 
(1.43) 
Percent of workers separating 52% 
 
69% 62% 
Percent of workers newly hired 55% 71% 
 
67% 
Share of new hires in firm 
undocumented 
1.2% 11.4% 
 
15.8% 
Share of workers in 6-digit NAICS 
industry undocumented 
1.3% 3.23% 3.68% 
Age of employer (number of quarters) 25.8 
(11.6) 
24.5 
(12.4) 
 
25.3 
(13.8) 
Employer size (number of workers) 
 
2,260 
(5365) 
1,175 
(2943) 
 
1,254 
(3808) 
Worker churning at place of 
employment (documented wrkrs only) 
56% 65% 
 
63% 
Distribution by skill intensity    
Low skill 20% 33% 32% 
Medium skill 67% 61% 63% 
High skill 13% 6% 5% 
NAICS Sector Shares    
Natural Resources and Agriculture 1% 8% 7% 
Construction 6% 12% 18% 
Manufacturing 11% 14% 9% 
Transportation and Utilities 3% 1% <1% 
Wholesale Trade 3% 3% 3% 
Retail Trade 17% 7% 8% 
Financial Activities 4% 2% 2% 
Information 3% <1% <1% 
Professional and Business Services 
(includes temporary services) 
23% 23% 21% 
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Education and Health Services 7% 3% 2% 
Leisure and Hospitality 19% 23% 24% 
Other Services  
(includes private household, laundry, 
and repair and maintenance services) 
3% 2% 
 
4% 
    
No. of observations 15,326,269 222,422 3,242 
Notes: Wages are real quarterly earnings, deflated by the chained price index for personal 
consumption expenditure $2006Q4.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Numbers in these cells 
do not reflect number of observations used in estimation as the estimation procedure requires two 
observations per worker to identify the fixed effect, thus reducing the usable sample size. 
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Table 3. OLS fixed-effect linear probability estimates of separation equation. 
 
 Full Samples 
Variable Documented Undocumented 
Intercept 1.1906* 
(0.0869) 
1.1365* 
(0.1691) 
ln(w) -0.1585* 
(0.0011) 
-0.1498* 
(0.0018) 
Tenure -0.0081* 
(0.0004) 
-0.0387* 
(0.0012) 
Age of employer 0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
0.0009* 
(0.0002) 
Employer size (# workers)/ 10000 -0.0168* 
(0.0048) 
-0.0201^ 
(0.0090) 
Worker churning at place of employment 0.1497* 
(0.0047) 
0.0952* 
(0.0091) 
% of  workers in industry that is undocumented -0.0007 
(0.0010) 
0.0004 
(0.0009) 
Percent of new hires in firm undocumented (h) 0.0518* 
(0.0171) 
0.1433* 
(0.0159) 
Y.Q 0.0044* 
(0.0009) 
0.0054* 
(0.0017) 
County unemployment rate -0.0016^ 
(0.0007) 
-0.0023 
(0.0016) 
   
Adjusted R sq. 0.31 0.31 
Labor supply elasticity ( nwε ) 0.569* 0.494* 
Separation elasticity wrt % of new hires undoc ( shε ) 0.0012* 0.0254* 
No. of Observations 8,069,046 118,104 
Notes:  Analysis includes workers employed in Georgia 1995-2000 inclusive.  Y.Q is a continuous 
variable constructed as Y ∈  [97,100] and quarter Q ∈ [00,75].  The worker fixed effect is constructed as 
a combination of the worker's SSN and worker's employer id number.  Standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level.   * ⇒ statistical significance at the 99 percent confidence level; ^ ⇒ 
statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level; + ⇒ statistical significance at the 90 percent 
confidence level. 
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Table 4. Labor supply elasticities ( nwε ) by wage quartiles and industry groups, for 1995-2000 samples 
and for 1997-2000 sample restricted to undocumented workers with ITIN numbering scheme. 
 
1995-2000 
δ =i SSN EMPID  
Undocumented workers 
restricted to those with ITIN 
1997-2000 
δ =i SSN  
Documented Undocumented Documented Undocumented
Full Sample 0.569* 0.494* 0.619* 0.475* 
Wage Quartiles 
Quartile 1 0.134* 0.085* 0.131* 0.261* 
Quartile 2 0.689* 0.394* 0.746* 0.191 
Quartile 3 1.391* 1.732* 2.215* 1.154 
Quartile 4 -0.027 0.250^ 1.270* -0.379 
Skill Intensity 
Low skill 0.593* 0.516* 0.590* 0.631* 
Medium skill 0.561* 0.493* 0.596* 0.460* 
High skill 0.687* 0.247* 0.885* neo
NAICS Sector 
Natural Resources and Ag. 0.433* 0.271* 0.420* 0.291^ 
Construction 0.630* 0.635* 0.676* 0.359* 
Manufacturing 0.884* 0.716* 0.903* 0.878* 
Transportation & Utilities 0.681* 0.325* 0.753* neo
Wholesale Trade 0.781* 0.497* 0.978* neo
Retail Trade 0.692* 0.376* 0.695 1.024+ 
Financial Activities 0.850* 0.303* 1.117* neo
Information 0.798* 0.135 0.930* neo
Professional & Bus Srvcs 0.439* 0.399* 0 .464* 0.382* 
Education and Health 0.778* 0.170* 0.893* neo
Leisure and Hospitality 0.578* 0.617* 0.586* 0.803* 
Other Services 0.536* 0.444* 0.665* neo
See notes to Table 3.  Confidence level determined by the significance of the underlying 
estimated parameter coefficient.  neo=not enough observations. 
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Table 5. Elasticities of separation with respect to undocumented new hires ( shε ) by wage quartiles and 
industry groups, for 1995-2000 samples and for 1997-2000 sample restricted to undocumented workers 
with ITIN numbering scheme. 
 
1995-2000 
δ =i SSN EMPID  
Undocumented workers 
restricted to those with ITIN 
1997-2000 
δ =i SSN  
Documented Undocumented Documented Undocumented
Full Sample 0.0019* 0.0258* 0.0009^ -0.0210 
Wage Quartiles 
Quartile 1 0.0011* 0.0078* 0.0005+ 0.0298 
Quartile 2 0.0036* 0.0082 0.0025* 0.0038 
Quartile 3 0.0032* 0.0069 0.0015+ -0.3703* 
Quartile 4 0.0022^ 0.0766* 0.0005 0.3526^ 
Skill Intensity 
Low skill 0.0056* 0.0313* 0.0035* 0.0453 
Medium skill 0.0017* 0.0230* 0.0008^ -0.0314 
High skill 0.0011 0.0381^ 0.0002 neo
NAICS Sector 
Natural Resources and Ag. -0.0095^ 0.0496* -0.020^ -0.0512 
Construction 0.0023* 0.0257^ 0.0022^ 0.0504 
Manufacturing -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0022 0.3395^ 
Transportation & Utilities 0.0020^ 0.0500 0.0007 neo
Wholesale Trade 0.0005 0.0718^ 0.0009 neo
Retail Trade 0.0019* 0.0269^ 0.0010* 0.0044 
Financial Activities -0.0019 0.0315 -0.0026+ neo
Information -0.0016 0.0967 -0.0058^ neo
Professional & Bus Srvcs 0.0010+ 0.0180* -0.0004 -0.0126 
Education and Health 0.0023* 0.0556^ 0.0015+ neo
Leisure and Hospitality 0.0061* 0.0141* 0.0055* 0.0516 
Other Services 0.0004 0.0234 -0.0014 neo
See notes to Table 3 and 4.  
 - A1 - 
Appendix A: Definition of Sectors 
 
Table A1: Definitions of sectors based on 2-digit NAIC classifications. 
 
Sector Included  
2-digit NAIC
Construction 23
Manufacturing 31-33
Transportation and Utilities 22, 48-49
Wholesale Trade 42
Retail Trade 44-45
Financial Activities 52-53
Information 51
Professional and Business Services (includes temporary services) 54-56
Education and Health Services 61-62
Leisure and Hospitality 71-72
Other Services  
(includes private household, laundry, and repair and maintenance services) 
81
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Appendix B: Skill Intensity Categories 
 
 Each industry is assigned a skill intensity based on the weighted average of educational 
attainment of workers in that industry, using the Current Population Survey for 1994.  This year 
was chosen since this is the first year in which the nativity (place of birth) of respondents is 
reported.  For each industry, the percent of workers with less than a high school education 
(LTHS), a high school education (HS), some college (SCOLL), college degree (COLL), and 
graduate education (GRAD) is calculated.  Skill intensity categories was assigned as follows: 
ܮ݋ݓ ݈݈ܵ݇݅ ൌ  ቄ1 ݂݅ ܮܶܪܵ ൐ ܪܵ ൅ ܥܱܮܮ
0 ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
 
ܪ݄݅݃ ݈݈ܵ݇݅ ൌ  ቄ1 ݂݅ ܵܥܱܮܮ ൅ ܥܱܮܮ ൅ ܩܴܣܦ ൐ ܪܵ ൅ ܵܥܱܮܮ
0 ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
 
ܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉ ݈݈ܵ݇݅ ൌ  ቄ1 ݂݅ ܪ݄݅݃ ݈݈ܵ݇݅ ൌ 0 ܽ݊݀ ܮ݋ݓ ݈݈ܵ݇݅ ൌ 0
0 ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
 
 About 23 percent of the industries are classified as high skill, 15 percent at low skill, and 
62 percent at medium skill.  Some examples of low skill industries include agriculture, some 
manufacturing, and accommodation and food services.  Medium skill industries include 
construction, retail trade, some manufacturing, some education and health, and arts and 
entertainment.  High skill industries include the information sector, electronic computer 
manufacturing, the financial sector, and some education and health. 
 
